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Goodwill Non-Impairments
Evidence from Recent Research and Suggestions for Auditors

By Dennis Chambers and
Catherine Finger
“Is there any point to which you would
wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in
the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,”
remarked Sherlock Holmes.
he legendary fictional detective
Sherlock Holmes, in this excerpt
from “Silver Blaze” by Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle, illustrates that the absence
of something, when it is expected, can provide strong evidence of actions not directly observed. This article extends Holmes’s
thinking to the case of goodwill accounting. Recent academic research provides
evidence about curious incidents of “goodwill non-impairment”—that is, the absence
of goodwill impairment losses when, like
a dog barking, they are expected.
When Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (SFAS) 142 was proposed as a
possible replacement for goodwill amortization, some academics and practitioners
were concerned that the unverifiable fair
value estimates used to measure goodwill
impairment losses would provide an opportunity for companies to manage earnings
by delaying the recognition of impairment
losses. After SFAS 142 was enacted in 2001,
accounting researchers had to wait until
enough years of earnings data existed to look
for evidence of goodwill-related earnings
management. Only now, with the recent
release of three working papers, are we getting a first glimpse into the existence of
goodwill non-impairment and how companies use the discretion in the goodwill standard to manage earnings. This article discusses these three studies within the context of Exhibit 1, which presents reporting
possibilities for companies that have goodwill assets. The columns describe whether

the goodwill has become impaired; the rows
describe the accounting choice made by the
firm in response.
If the economic value of a goodwill asset
has decreased, then the goodwill has

goodwill impairment losses are absent
when they would cause company earnings to be negative or would cause earnings decreases. Impairment losses are also
absent when they would decrease CEO

become impaired (Exhibit 1, first column).
Goodwill impairment standards require
companies to report the current-year
decline in value as a loss in current-year
net income. Companies that follow the
standards would be in box A. Companies
with impaired goodwill that choose to
either not report the loss or report an understated loss would be in box B (i.e., goodwill non-impairment). Firms in box B may
have used accounting discretion to avoid
reporting a loss; nevertheless, they are not
following the intent of the impairment
reporting standard.
The three studies report evidence that
goodwill non-impairment does exist (i.e.,
that there are firms in box B). In addition,
the non-impairment is associated with
incentives managers have to overstate earnings. They find evidence that recorded

compensation, damage CEO reputations,
and cause bond covenant violations.
Finally, evidence suggests that an impairment loss is not recorded at the time a
goodwill asset generates cash flows, as
implied by economic theory, but rather
much later. Therefore, these studies indicate that early concerns of academics and
practitioners were warranted; companies
appear to be using the discretion in goodwill impairment reporting standards to
manage earnings.
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Goodwill Accounting Standards
In June 2001, FASB enacted two standards related to the accounting for goodwill. The first, SFAS 141 (now found in
ASC section 805-30), required that business acquisitions would henceforth be
accounted for using the purchase method.
FEBRUARY 2011 / THE CPA JOURNAL

Under the purchase method, the purchaser compares the fair value of all acquired
net assets (total identifiable assets minus
liabilities) with the sum of the fair value
of consideration paid for the acquisition.
The difference is accounted for as a
goodwill asset at the time of the purchase.
(Recently, FASB has modified these procedures, now calling them the acquisition
method; however, the modifications were
enacted after the sample periods of the
three studies described here.)
The second goodwill-related accounting
standard was SFAS 142 (now found in ASC
section 350-20). This standard abolished systematic amortization of goodwill and instituted a procedure for annual goodwill impairment testing. Impairment testing is carried
out at the reporting unit level; a reporting
unit is defined as a portion of the company
one level lower than the segment level (management decides how much goodwill to allocate to each reporting unit).
SFAS 142 specified the following procedure for annual goodwill impairment
testing. The company estimates the fair
value of a reporting unit and compares it
with the unit’s book value—including the
book value of goodwill. If the unit’s fair
value is less than its book value, then an
impairment has taken place. A second step
is required to determine whether the goodwill asset is the source of the impairment.
The company estimates the implied fair
value of the unit’s goodwill by subtracting the fair value of the non-goodwill net
assets from the unit’s total fair value—the
residual equals the implied fair value of
goodwill. If the implied fair value of goodwill is less than the goodwill’s book value,
then the goodwill is impaired and the
impairment is equal to that difference. The
impairment losses across all units are
aggregated and recognized, resulting in a
reduction of reported net income.

Discretion in Goodwill Accounting
The process of testing goodwill assets
for impairment involves many opportunities for exercising accounting discretion and
potentially permits income manipulation.
First, the initial goodwill asset recorded
under the purchase method and the allocation of the goodwill to reporting units
require the application of accounting discretion. Next, because reporting units are
not traded separately in the stock market,
FEBRUARY 2011 / THE CPA JOURNAL

verifiable unit fair value measures are not
available. Thus, each unit’s value must be
based on difficult-to-verify estimates of
its future cash flows—cash flows that are
themselves a product of management’s
future decisions and actions as well as
unpredictable future macroeconomic forces.
In addition, estimates of the fair value of
the individual non-goodwill assets and
liabilities are necessarily based on unobservable Level 3–type inputs. (According
to ASC section 820-10-35, Level 3 inputs
consist of unobservable characteristics and
assumptions, as compared to Level 1 and
2 inputs, which include actual prices or
other verifiable characteristics.)
Therefore, the process of testing goodwill
for impairment gives significant discretion
to management. If a company’s goodwill has
become impaired, but executives want to
avoid recording an impairment loss, they can
manipulate their estimates to suggest the
goodwill is not impaired and argue that judgment justifies their unimpaired goodwill measure. In addition, the estimates are difficult
for an auditor to question because they are
based on unverifiable characteristics, assumptions, and cash flow projections that are presumably within the special expertise of management. Consequently, the potential for
manipulation of impairment loss, and therefore reported net income, is very great.

use of fair value estimates to determine goodwill value, expressing concern that the proposed estimates were not sufficiently reliable
to justify the recording of asset value
changes. Mark F. Massoud and Cecily A.
Raiborn predicted that the “significant leeway” given to companies to value goodwill
would lead to earnings management
(“Accounting for Goodwill: Are We Better
Off?” Review of Business, vol. 24, no. 2,
2003, p. 26). Ross L. Watts also argued
that the discretion given in the new goodwill standard opens the possibility of earnings manipulation: “Assessing impairment
requires valuation of future cash flows.
Because those future cash flows are unlikely to be verifiable and contractible, they, and
the valuation based on them, are likely to
be manipulated” (“Conservatism in
Accounting Part I: Explanations and
Implication,” Accounting Horizons, vol. 17,
no. 3, 2003, pp. 207–221).
These articles articulate the deep concern many had that the discretion afforded to companies by SFAS 142 would result
in earnings manipulation. We now
discuss evidence that these concerns were
justified based on one specific type of
earnings manipulation: goodwill nonimpairment (i.e., not recording a correct
impairment loss when goodwill has
become impaired—Exhibit 1, box B).

Concerns Expressed Before SFAS 142

Results from Recent Research

When FASB issued the exposure draft for
its proposed goodwill accounting standards,
it found significant opposition. Eric E. Lewis,
Jeffrey W. Lippitt, and Nicholas J.
Mastracchio Jr. noted that comment letters
sent to FASB were highly critical of the discretion afforded preparers’ estimates of fair
values (“Users’ Comments on SFAS 141
and 142 on Business Combinations and
Goodwill,” The CPA Journal, vol. 71, no.
10, 2001, p. 26). Responders criticized the

Goodwill non-impairments related to
earnings benchmarks. A large body of
accounting research has found evidence
that companies tend to manage their earnings upward to avoid reporting a loss or a
reduction in earnings (e.g., see David
Burgstahler and Ilia Dichev, “Earnings
Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases
and Losses,” Journal of Accounting &
Economics, vol. 24, no. 1, 1997). The
author (Dennis Chambers, “Earnings

EXHIBIT 1
Reporting Possibilities for Companies That Have Goodwill Assets
Goodwill is impaired
Goodwill loss is
correctly recorded

Box A: No earnings
management

Goodwill loss is
reduced or not recorded

Box B: Upward
earnings management

Goodwill is not impaired
Box C: No earnings
management
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Management by Avoiding or Reducing
Goodwill Impairments,” working paper,
2010) asks whether firms use goodwill
impairment accounting to manage their
earnings in this setting. He refers to the
earnings management targets where earnings go from positive to negative (i.e., zero
earnings), and where earnings changes go
from positive to negative, as earnings
“breakpoints.” Chambers looks for evidence that firms avoid or reduce goodwill
impairments in order to report earnings that
are above these breakpoints.
To explain a potentially measurable
result of such earnings management, consider a hypothetical set of 500 firms that

would report earnings below a breakpoint
in the absence of earnings management. Of
those 500, suppose 100 have impaired
goodwill and, as such, their earnings should
include a goodwill impairment loss. In
the absence of earnings management, 20%
of the firms below the breakpoint (100/500)
should report an impairment loss. Now,
suppose that of the 100 with impaired
goodwill, 40 choose to report either no
impairment loss or a reduced loss, allowing those firms to report earnings above
the breakpoint. In this case, only 13% of
the remaining firms below the breakpoint
(60/460) would be reporting an impairment
loss. Chambers’ study examines the firms

EXHIBIT 2
Results of Related Recent Working Papers
Authors and Journal
Information

Description of Sample

Main Results

Dennis Chambers,
“Earnings Management
by Avoiding or Reducing
Goodwill Impairments,”
2010

16,913 company-year
observations, representing 4,737 US domiciled
companies with material
goodwill assets during
the years 2004 through
2008.

Companies tend to avoid
or reduce goodwill impairments when the impairment would result in the
company reporting a
loss or a reduction in
net income.

Karthik Ramanna and
Ross L. Watts, “Evidence
on the Use of Unverifiable
Estimates in Required
Goodwill Impairment,”
2010

124 firms between the
years 2003 and 2006 with
a high likelihood of goodwill impairment based on
large goodwill asset and
high book-to-market ratio.

Contrary to FASB expectations, managers do not
appear to be conveying
positive private information when they choose
not to record goodwill
impairment losses.
Goodwill impairments
are absent when they
would decrease CEO
compensation, damage
CEO reputations, and
potentially cause bond
covenant violations.

Kevin K. Li and Richard
G. Sloan, “Has Goodwill
Accounting Gone Bad?,”
2009

23,224 company-year
observations over the
years 2000 through 2007.

Goodwill impairments
tend to be delayed until
there is little if any value
remaining in the goodwill
asset, rather than being
impaired as the value
decreases.
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just below the breakpoints to see if there
are fewer than expected goodwill impairments among those firms, as evidence of
goodwill-based earnings management.
(Chambers notes that he could also look
for evidence of earnings management
among the firms just above the breakpoint,
but the effect on the percentage of firms
impairing goodwill would be significantly
less and therefore harder to measure.)
Using several advanced statistical methods to measure the occurrence and size of
goodwill impairments, Chambers finds that
among the firms just below the zero earnings breakpoint, the number impairing
goodwill is 48.8% lower than expected.
Similarly, he finds that among the firms
reporting earnings just below the zero
change-in-earnings breakpoint, the number
with goodwill impairments is 19.9% lower
than expected.
Chambers also finds that the average
company with a reported goodwill asset
impairs 14.6% of that asset in any given
year. However, companies reporting earnings just below zero impair far less of their
goodwill—an average of 1.5%. In the same
way, companies reporting a small reduction in earnings—those just below the earnings-change breakpoint—report goodwill
impairments that are 6.7 percentage
points lower than average.
Overall, Chambers’ findings are consistent with companies avoiding reporting
impairment losses that would cause earnings to go negative or would cause a
decrease in earnings relative to the previous period. This is strong evidence that
companies manage earnings by avoiding
or reducing goodwill impairments when
they have incentives to report positive or
increasing earnings.
Goodwill non-impairments related to
CEO reputation, CEO compensation, and
debt covenants. Karthik Ramanna and
Ross L. Watts (“Evidence on the Use of
Unverifiable Estimates in Required
Goodwill Impairment,” 2010, working
paper), describe how FASB expected that
managers, under SFAS 142, “will, on average, use estimates of goodwill’s fair value
to convey private information on future
cash flows. In contrast, agency theory
predicts managers will on average use
unverifiable discretion, such as that in
goodwill impairment tests, opportunistically.” Ramanna and Watts examine
FEBRUARY 2011 / THE CPA JOURNAL

whether goodwill non-impairment is
associated with either positive private information or opportunistic behavior by selecting a sample of firms for which the market may expect impairments. Within that
group of firms, they then compare the characteristics of firms that record a goodwill
impairment loss (i.e., box A) with the firms
that do not (i.e., boxes B and C).
Goodwill non-impairment is justified
when managers legitimately believe, based
on positive private information, that the
current book value of goodwill does not
overstate its fair value (i.e., box C).
Ramanna and Watts assess whether managers’ positive private information is
associated with goodwill non-impairment.
They measure positive private information
by looking for company stock repurchases and insider buying activity—each of
these would be indications that management believes the company’s stock is
undervalued. They also use advanced content analysis to measure the extent to which
management includes “achievement-related words” in the companies’ 10-Ks. Higher
numbers of such words are interpreted as
greater positive private information. They
find no significant relation between any
of their measures of positive private
information and the recording of goodwill
impairment losses. This result is inconsistent with managers using goodwill accounting discretion to convey their positive private information, as intended by FASB.
Ramanna and Watts then assess whether
potential earnings management behavior is
related to goodwill non-impairment (i.e., box
B). Specifically, they examine a number of
characteristics likely to create incentives to
delay impairments. These include high stock
price sensitivity to earnings, exchange listing requirements sensitive to goodwill
impairments, long CEO tenure (as a proxy
for CEO reputation), and debt covenants and
CEO compensation contracts that are sensitive to goodwill impairments. They find no
evidence that stock-price sensitivity or
exchange listing requirements are associated with goodwill non-impairments. Among
the non-impairing firms, however, they
find a statistically higher proportion with
goodwill-inclusive debt covenants, goodwillinclusive CEO compensation contracts, and
longer CEO tenure.
Overall, Ramanna and Watts find little
evidence that managers use the discretion
FEBRUARY 2011 / THE CPA JOURNAL

in goodwill accounting as FASB intended:
to convey private information about
goodwill assets. Instead, they find evidence
consistent with managers managing goodwill impairment losses in order to reduce
debt covenant violations, increase CEO
compensation, and protect CEO reputation.
Goodwill non-impairments related to
cash flows. Kevin K. Li and Richard G.
Sloan (“Has Goodwill Accounting Gone
Bad?” 2009, working paper) examine

They find evidence consistent with
managers managing goodwill
impairment losses in order to
reduce debt covenant violations,
increase CEO compensation, and
protect CEO reputation.

whether goodwill impairments occur in a
timely way. The fair value of goodwill,
as with any asset, should be equal to the
present value of the future cash flows expected to be gained from the goodwill asset.
Therefore, ironically, goodwill should lose
the most value (and impairment losses
should be greatest) in the periods when the
largest cash flows from goodwill are realized (consistent with the matching principle).
Li and Sloan use advanced statistical
techniques to examine whether goodwill
impairment losses are recorded at the
time when they are expected (i.e., when
high positive goodwill-related cash flows
are realized). Contrary to expectations,
impairment losses are associated with poor
company performance—low positive or
negative goodwill-related cash flows. In
other words, companies appear to delay the

recording of goodwill impairment losses
until the related cash flows are almost
exhausted, long after the fair value of the
goodwill has been lost.

Implications for Auditors
When FASB issued the exposure draft
that eventually became SFAS 142, there was
great concern that the discretion given to
companies to value goodwill would result in
companies using manipulated goodwill
impairment losses to manage earnings. Now
that sufficient years have passed since the
enactment of SFAS 142, accounting
researchers have begun to look for evidence that those concerns were justified.
Although no studies have yet been published,
the three recent working papers described in
this article provide strong initial evidence that
companies are indeed using their discretion
in determining goodwill fair value to delay
or reduce goodwill impairments in order to
manage earnings.
It behooves auditors and investors alike
to give special attention to the goodwill
assets of companies reporting earnings, or
a change in earnings, just above zero.
These companies have strong incentives to
manipulate goodwill impairment testing to
avoid reporting a loss or a reduction in
earnings. Similarly, auditors should carefully examine goodwill fair value measures
when related impairments would lead to
losses that would significantly decrease
CEO compensation, damage CEO reputations, or violate bond covenants. Finally,
if a company has high cash flows that
appear to stem from goodwill assets,
auditors should make sure the corresponding impairment of goodwill fair value
has also been recorded. Based on these
recent academic studies of goodwill impairment, it is likely that at least some companies are manipulating their impairment
testing to delay or reduce goodwill impairments consistent with opportunistic earn❑
ings management.
Dennis Chambers, PhD, is an associate professor in the school of accountancy at Kennesaw State University,
Kennesaw, Ga. Catherine Finger,
PhD, is an assistant professor in the
school of economics and business administration at Saint Mary’s College of
California, Moraga, Calif.
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